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What concept of disease should politicians use? Norman Daniels and the 
unjustifiable appeal of naturalistic analyses of health
1. Introduction.
One of  the  central  question  of  evidence-based  policy  is  the  extent  to  which  the  contents  and 
priorities of health care should be based on scientific criteria. Norman Daniels's theory of just health 
care  is  particularly  interesting  in  this  respect,  because  it  involves  a  significant  commitment  to 
naturalism in the definition of health and disease. Daniels's goal is to set limits to what justice 
requires with respect to meeting citizens' health needs, or in other words, to define the boundaries of 
citizens' reciprocal obligations with respect to those needs (Daniels 2000; Daniels 2008, 147-155).1 
Daniels's  solution  to  these  normative  questions  involves  treating  pathologies  differently  from 
unfavorable conditions that are still normal, like bad memory or an ugly outlook.2 He claims that 
this distinction is sufficiently objective for political purposes if it is based upon bio-medical criteria, 
a solution which must look problematic to those who suspect that bio-medical science is not value-
neutral. 
One  ground for  this  suspicion  may be  the  idea  that  the  distinction  between health  and 
pathology cannot be explained by appealing to the categories of natural science. Some philosophers 
think, for instance, that health must be defined relative to society's norms and requirements or to a 
person's  well-being  or  goals.  In  support  of  naturalisms  about  the  health/pathology  distinction, 
Daniels invokes the authority of Christopher Boorse, perhaps the most prominent champion of this 
position. Boorse's theory, the Bio-Statistical Theory (in short, BST), aims to provide an analysis of 
the  concepts  of  health  and disease,  which  would  explain  why pathologists  can  distinguish  the 
corresponding conditions without relying on values, whether their own, the patients, or society's. 
Daniels commitment to naturalism may appear less stringent than Boorse's because Daniels claims 
that health justice is compatible with theories that, unlike the BST, maintain that the concept of 
1 Moreover, this goal is part of a more inclusive objective, namely showing that Rawls's “Two Principles of Justice” 
(Rawls 1999; Rawls 1993) can be extended to cover issues of justice posed by illness and disability.
2 In other words, the goal of curing or compensating for pathological conditions represents the “primary rationale” of 
health care. This does not exclude the relevance of other sorts of considerations when establishing concrete 
allocative criteria for health care resources. First of all, under a reasonable budget constraint it would be impossible 
to address all conditions that biomedical science classifies as diseases, since society ought to pursue other important 
goals beside promoting the health of its citizens (such as free education, considered a prerequisite for fair 
opportunities). Hence further normative criteria are needed to set priorities among conditions that are identified as 
diseases. Second, there might be medical services that society ought to make available because they protect citizens' 
opportunities even if they cannot be said to promote their health, such as abortion. (Daniels 2000, 313-314; Daniels 
2008, 146-155)
Michele Loi Paper for ESPP 2009 2
health has both descriptive and evaluative components.
I shall argue that Daniels's commitment to a qualified form of naturalism lacks an adequate 
justification,  because  of  its  dependency from a  naturalistic  account  of  normal  functioning  à la 
Boorse. I shall proceed as follows: first, I shall specify what Daniels's commitment to naturalism 
amounts to. Then, I shall present a recent criticism of the BST (Kingma 2007), which shows that the 
Boorsian analysis of normal functioning is not value-free or naturalistic. Elselijn Kingma's thesis, I 
shall argue, leads to challenging Daniels's commitment to naturalism, since the BST represents the 
most influential attempt to define normal functioning in value-neutral terms. In particular it leads us 
to reject Daniels's argument - presented in his last book Just Health (Daniels 2008) - according to 
which the distinctions that we make in practice support a naturalistic analysis of normal functioning 
(à la Boorse) .
2. Daniels' commitment to naturalism.
 Daniels's starting point is Boorse's theory, the BST, which defines health as the absence of 
pathology and pathology as a departure from normal human functioning (Daniels 2008, 38; Boorse 
1975; Boorse 1977; Boorse 1997). According to Boorse, the concept of normal functioning belongs 
to natural science, with “normal” construed statistically and “functioning” biologically. Hence the 
BST allegedly treats the boundary between health and disease as entirely independent from the 
values held by doctors, patients, and society in general.
Daniels's  commitment  to  naturalism  is  weaker  than  Boorse's.  It  does  not  demand  that 
“disease” be defined naturalistically and as a mere departure from normal functioning3; rather it 
takes  departure  from  normal  functioning  as  a  necessary  condition  that  must  be  satisfied  for 
something to count as disease.4 In this way Daniels can include views, like Wakefield's, that define 
disease as a condition both dysfunctional and harmful to its bearer (Wakefield 1992; Daniels 2008, 
39). According to Wakefield's view, dyslexia (a departure from normal functioning) does not count 
3 To be more precise, there is no substantial distinction between Boorse's and Daniels's view on this point, since 
Boorse claims that his naturalistic analysis applies only to the distinctions used in theoretical physiology and 
pathology. Clinical practice, on the contrary, involves several value-laden concepts of disease, such as “deviation 
from normal functioning worthy of being examined and treated”, (Boorse 1997, 11-12; cf. Boorse 1975, 61) . Hence 
Daniels's concession to normativism is equivalent to the reformulation of an analogous point by Boorse. Moreover, 
Daniels avoids a commitment to subtle details of Boorse theory, that he considers irrelevant for the more limited 
purposes of political theory “Fortunately, for our purposes in bioethics and political philosophy, we do not have to 
resove all disputes in the philosophy of biology before we can safely employ a widely used notion such as 'normal 
functioning.'” (Daniels 2008, 38, cf. 39 n20; cf. Daniels 2000, 318). These details are “its avoidance of an etiological 
or "natural selection" account of biological function and its avoidance of all normative judgments in identifying 
departures from normal functioning” (Daniels 2008, 38).
4 “[...] the normative approach I do consider a threat to public agreement is not constrained by an independent account 
of departures from normal functioning” (Daniels 2008, 40).  Further textual evidence leaves no doubt that the 
adjective “independent” is meant here as implying “naturalistic”: see for instance the passage quoted in note 6. 
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as a disease in those illiterate societies where it does not lead to any substantial disability.5 
Daniels's  compromise  with  normativism does  not  touch  the  distinction  between  normal 
functioning and what counts as a departure thereof, which he – like Boorse – views as naturalistic.6 
This commitment I shall call “weak naturalism”.Weak naturalism justifies the idea that most bio-
medical classifications are grounded, ultimately, in scientific knowledge of facts independent from 
the patient's, the doctor's, or society's values.7  If weak naturalism were correct, it would ground 
people's faith in the objectivity and value-neutrality of bio-medical distinctions and justify defining 
health needs on that basis.8 
3.  Normal functioning and evaluative assumptions.
Boorse's BST represents the most influential analysis of normal functioning alleged to be 
naturalistic. Hence, I shall assume that criticizing the BST amounts to criticizing weak naturalism in 
its most plausible form. 
The BST defines pathology as an impairment or limitation of normal functional ability. The 
normal function of a part or process in an organism is defined as its normal contribution to the 
survival  and  reproduction  of  that  organism,  where  by  “normal  contribution”  one  means  a 
statistically normal contribution for species members of the same reference class. Reference classes 
are said to be, for humans, sex and age group (Boorse 1977, 562; Boorse 1997, 7)9. This means that 
Obama is in full health if and only if all his functions are statistically normal for a 45 year old male 
human beings. BST needs reference classes because, for instance, the level of testosterone which is 
normal for an adult male is not the same as that which would be normal in an adult female or in a 
male child.
The choice of reference classes is a crucial element in the BST definition of health, because 
different reference classes result in different boundaries between the healthy and pathological. For 
instance,  if  the  ability  to  see  is  selected  as  a  reference  class,  short-sightedness  becomes  the 
5 According to Daniels, individual harm should be conceptualized as loss of opportunities, at least in the context of 
political justice.(Daniels 2000, 315; Daniels 2008, 42-46)  
6 "For our purposes in this account of just health, it is enough to know that the intuitive distinction underlying the 
biomedical view of heath - that health is the absence of pathology - can be reformulated into a nonnormative (or 
naturalistic) distinction between normal functioning and pathology, even if this departs from some features of 
ordinary usage." (Daniels 2008, 42) 
7 One may concede that biomedical distinctions are not strictly independent from society's values, since a change in 
social values may facilitate the recognition of pre-existing objective natural facts. But this is different from claiming 
that social values are among the facts to which biomedical classifications refer. 
8 As Daniels writes: “My purposes are satisfied when the line between the normal and the abnormal or pathological is, 
for most cases, uncontroversial and ascertainable by publicly acceptable methods, such as those of the biomedical 
sciences” (Daniels 2008, 42; cf.Daniels 2000, 317-318).
9 Although in the most recent discussion of the BST, Boorse concedes that it might be appropriate to add ethnic group 
as a reference class.(Boorse 1997, 8)
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statistically normal  condition for members of a legitimate reference class  (that  of  short-sighted 
people), and hence it ceases to be considered a pathology. 
It has been argued that the concept of statistical normality used by the BST is not value free, 
because Boorse's choice of reference classes has no empirical justification (Kingma 2007, 131). To 
fully grasp Kingma's point, it is useful to distinguish two rather different cases in which we would 
say that a definition of disease is value laden. The first case is when it is impossible to apply the 
definition to a concrete case without answering a value question. This happens, for instance, when 
the definition mentions a value, as with Wakefields' “harmful to its bearer” clause.
The second is when a value judgment is appealed to in order to justify the choice of using a 
certain definition instead of a different one. There are cases in which the appeal to values to justify 
the use of a certain definition – or a whole conceptual framework – does not worry us. Simplicity, 
accuracy and usability can be legitimately invoked in  choosing between Newtonian physics  or 
general relativity to solve a concrete engineering problem. Things get interesting, however, when 
one has reasons to suspect that the choice of a conceptual framework is not justifiable in terms of 
ordinary epistemic or pragmatic considerations.10 
According to Elselijn Kingma, Boorse's choice of reference classes “is an evaluative choice 
which may reflect some deep underlying normative commitments” (Kingma 2007, 132).  Imagine 
that you have to decide whether to count homosexuality as a pathology and that you can choose 
whether to adopt the criteria offered by the BST or by a slightly different theory, which we shall 
label XST, identical to the BST but for counting sexual inclination as an additional reference class. 
According to XST homosexuality, understood as a sexual drive, is not pathological because it does 
not impair the reproductive success of individuals in that condition as measured against the norm 
for  their  reference  class.  Deciding  whether  homosexuality  is  a  pathology,  hence,  amounts  to 
deciding whether to employ one or the other set of criteria, or in other words deciding which choice 
of reference classes one finds more reasonable. 
Since Boorse defines a reference class as “a natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design” (Boorse 1977, 562; Boorse 1997, 7), the question is whether it makes sense to treat a group 
of individuals who share similar sexual drives as a natural class. According to Kingma, here we 
10 The idea that natural science is not absolutely value-free is a familiar one in epistemology. For instance simplicity is 
a meta-theoretical value that, according to most epistemologists, can be invoked in favor of theoretical choice. 
Moreover if, as some philosophers think, truth is always truth relative to a conceptual scheme, and the choice of 
conceptual schemes is the outcome of a convention, the truths of natural science may be thought to depend in 
general from the values which ground the convention. Boorse turns the argument that health cannot be value free 
because all science is value laden against its proponents, by claiming that the BST reaches its purpose if it can show 
that medicine is only as value laden as the rest of science (e.g. astrophysics) (Boorse 1997, 55 cf. 75). The point of 
the following argument is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that this proviso is not satisfied.
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have a problem, because it is not clear what the definition means. Moreover, if we try to clarify it by 
means of a naturalistic paraphrases we end up classifying certain obvious pathologies as varieties of 
natural  species  design  and  viceversa.11 If  the  definition  of  a  reference  class  does  not  have  a 
satisfactory  naturalistic  translation,  as  Kingma  shows,  we  should  conclude  that  the  choice  of 
reference classes is arbitrary or value-laden (Kingma 2007, 132). If Boorse replies that the choice is 
not arbitrary because it is the one that best fits our current medical classifications,12 then we should 
conclude that these classifications are to some degree arbitrary or that they rely on value premises 
that Boorse's analysis fails to reveal. 
4. Troubles for Daniels's argument.
Let us now go back to Normal Daniels's naturalistic commitment.  I shall now argue that 
Kingma's critique of the BST leads to rejecting Daniels's justification for it. In Daniels's last work 
one finds two explicit arguments in support of the position I have called “weak naturalism”: one 
appeals to the existence of practices where people make clear distinctions between pathologies and 
other causes of dissatisfaction. The other says that bio-medical distinctions define the focus of the 
existing public consensus concerning the extension of medical treatments. Reasons of space force 
me to consider only the first argument.
In my reconstruction, this argument involves three main claims:
- 1) We ought to distinguish those analyses of the meaning of the health/disease distinction which 
appeal to a naturalistic account of normal functioning from those which do not. 
- 2) Theories of the second group imply that, in everyday contexts, we are not able to draw clear 
distinctions  between  pathologies  and  other  conditions  deemed  undesirable  (by  the  patient,  the 
doctor, or society).13
- 3) That is in tension with the sociological observation that, for a central range of cases, doctors, 
patients and other health professionals seem comfortable with making and accepting the distinction 
11 More precisely, Kingma considers three possible interpretations of “natural class of organism of uniform functional 
design”: as statistically common characteristics, as classes characterized by a high degree of uniformity among class 
members, and as classes which are natural, that is, belong to the natural design of the species. The first interpretation 
is unacceptable, because some age groups and the queen design in the bee have very few members. The second must 
be rejected because many diseases, especially genetic ones, can be remarkably uniform. The third appeals to either a 
theological concept of design or an evolutionary one. If the latter, it must be rejected because some pathologies (e.g. 
sickle cell anaemia) result from adaptation.
12 This objection is modeled upon Boorse's reply to an analogous objection concerning the evaluative presuppositions 
of the analysis of biological functions. Cf. “there is no choice here - that is simply what disease is, as the concept is 
best reconstructed from medical classifications.” (Boorse 1997, 28).
13 “If the extreme normative view were true, it would show up in our practice in a very different way. We would talk 
and behave differently than we do” (Daniels 2008, 40); “Were the normative view correct [...] we would not draw 
the reasonably clear distinction we do.” (Daniels 2008, 40). Daniels's “extreme normative view” is by definition the 
denial of weak naturalism.
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in question.14   
To  show that  we should  reject  Daniels's  argument  I  shall  employ Kingma's  critique  of 
Boorse in two different ways. At first, I shall accept Kingma's conclusion that the BST is “in all 
relevant ways evaluative” (Kingma 2007, 132). Later, I shall concede that the concept of normal 
functioning  defined  by  the  BST is  naturalistic  and  argue  that  Daniels's  position  is  untenable, 
provided  that,  as  Kingma  shows,  the  choice  of  reference  classes  cannot  be  justified  from  a 
naturalistic standpoint.15   
The first counter-argument is very simple. Boorse claims that the BST definition of normal 
functioning fits the standard usage of “healthy” and “pathological” in theoretical medicine, that is, 
in physiology and pathology. If that is true, it must be true irrespective of whether  the choice of 
reference  classes  is  fully  justifiable  from a  naturalistic  standpoint.  Since  theoretical  pathology 
distinguishes pathologies from other conditions regarded undesirable, the BST is incompatible with 
at least one practice involving the distinction in question. In conclusion, the BST is not naturalistic, 
as assumed, and is compatible with distinguishing pathological conditions from undesirable ones. 
Hence, if Kingma is right, the BST itself qualifies as a counterexample to Daniels's second claim. 
Let  us  now  adopt  the  second  strategy  and  assume  that  the  BST  concept  of  normal 
functioning is naturalistic even if the choice of reference classes cannot be justified from within a 
naturalistic standpoint.  If  that  is  true,  the same can be said about XST, identical  to BST in all 
respects except for counting sexual inclination as a reference class. The question is therefore how to 
choose  between  BST and  XST,  given  that  Daniels's  argument  against  non-naturalistic  theories 
cannot be used to discriminate between the two. This choice matters politically because it implies a 
redrawing of the boundary between health needs and other conditions.16 
14 Daniels claims that women who very much desire a breast enlargement do not normally view their actual condition 
as a disease and that current laws and insurance practices do not call pregnancy a disease, even when they are 
dictated by politicians who think abortion services should belong within basic health insurance packages. (Daniels 
2008, 41-41)  Daniels's conclusion is that “in our language and practice, as these examples suggest, we do not 
confuse unwanted conditions with pathology. We do not expand our category of diseases or pathology to include all 
the conditions we want to change medically.” (Daniels 2008, 40) . Notice the use of the term “confuse” to 
characterize the consequences of rejecting weak naturalism. 
15 Boorse has written that “when a concept is precisified one way rather than another for evaluative reasons, the result 
can still be a value-free concept: cf. "meter," "degreee C," or virtually any other unit of measure” (Boorse 1997, 28). 
Hence, he may argue that Kingma's analysis shows, at most, that we should distinguish two equally legitimate 
concepts of normal functioning, normal functioning1 and normal functioning2, and that if medicine has chosen one 
of them for evaluative reasons, the result can still be a value-free concept. 
16 In a certain respect XST would deny homosexual people one or several “rights to medical treatment” (rights to be 
cured “of one's homosexuality” or of other conditions resulting from  it) that the adoption of the BST may justify. 
One may claim that a theory which ascribes additional rights to a minority cannot be criticized since it does  not 
force anybody to take advantage of such rights, thus protecting the integrity of homosexual people. Things however 
are not so simple: a society which regards homosexual people as biologically defective individuals and, therefore, as 
legitimate recipients of health care is less likely to treat homosexual people with equal dignity in other areas of 
political life. For instance it may allow for the selective screening of embryos with a “gay gene”, in the name of the 
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The question is therefore what degree of disagreement concerning the distinction between 
normal functioning and pathology is compatible with its alleged naturalistic grounding. Daniels's 
position  is  that  naturalism is  compatible  with  much argument  on how to draw this  distinction 
(Daniels 2008, 42).17 But Daniels also claims that "disputes about it can generally be resolved by the 
publicly accessible methods of the biomedical sciences" (Daniels 2008, 42).18 
The  last  claim,  however,  is  unconvincing:  if  different  ways  of  drawing  the  distinction 
between normal functioning and pathology look equally arbitrary from a naturalistic standpoint, 
then  disputes  about  where  we  should  draw this  boundary cannot  be  resolved  by  appealing  to 
biomedical science. 
The only way to escape this conclusion is to define the methods of biomedical science so 
broadly that they include a substantial amount of what is commonly regarded as ethical and political 
reasoning. But this epistemological idea returns a much blurred picture of the distinction between 
the scope of biomedical science and the scope of moral and political theory, which is incompatible 
with Daniels's idea that biomedical distinctions enjoy a privileged condition of objectivity19. 
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